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Inflation was a major concern for Prebisch from his time in 
central banking up to the end of his career, when he stressed 
the need for new thinking by Latin American economists 
about stabilization policy. The topic is of vital importance, 
not only for Latin America, but also for the world in 
general, for specialists in industrialized countries have also 
been unable to elaborate policy recommendations for their 
governments that will resolve the dilemma between 
inflation and monetary restriction. 
Economists have searched arduously for a theory of 
inflation that corresponds with the facts, but have not 
achieved a consensus. On the contrary, strong disagreement 
persists as to why inflation behaves in ways so different 
from those described in established theory. Consequently, 
there are also differences in policies designed to halt or 
slow the process. 
Given this lack of a policy that can stop it, inflation 
presents serious obstacles to economic growth throughout 
the world and causes very serious social problems in many 
countries. For fear of accelerating inflation, industrial 
nations are limiting economic activity to levels below 
productive capacity and, due to the lack of politically 
feasible stabilization programmes, a number of developing 
countries (especially in Latin America) are undergoing 
inflationary processes that cause severe damage to their 
economic, social and political structures. Therefore, today, 
the control of inflation constitutes the highest priority for 
economic science. 
•Economic Adviser to the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"We have not offered governments a set of coherent 
and attainable principles that will allow them to 
escape the dilemma between inflation and monetary 
orthodoxy. We Latin American economists are in debt 
to the politicians of our countries. " 
RAUL PREBISCH 
El fatso dilema entre desarrollo económico y 
estabilidad monetaria, March 1961. 
"... I am convinced that we must renew our thinking 
about stabilization and capital accumulation policy. " 
RAUL PREBISCH 
Statement at the twenty-first session ofECLAC, 24 
April 1986. 
I 
Price trends in Latin America: 
1961-1990 
Table 1 presents average retail price increases in 19 
Latin American countries during the 1960s and 1970s 
and the annual figures for the 1980s. During these 
three decades, inflation was constant and generalized. 
The only exceptions were Guatemala in 1982 and 
Panama in 1986, 1988 and 1989, years in which real 
economic activity experienced strong contractions in 
those countries. It is also possible that there are errors 
in the figures because, during the years in question, 
prices rose in the United States, the main supplier of 
both countries. Examination of the table reveals, first 
of all, that inflation was a persistent phenomenon in 
all Latin American countries during the last three 
decades. This is an entirely expected conclusion and 
cannot surprise either economists or lay persons in the 
era of global inflation. However, its causes must be 
investigated in depth. 
Further analysis of the table leads to the second 
observation that inflation has accelerated during the 
period, at a moderate rate during the 1970s and 
explosively in the 1980s. In the 1960s, four countries 
experienced annual inflation rates of 20% to 50%, 
another four, from 5% to 20%, while the rest 
registered rates the same or lower than that of the 
United States, yielding an average of 21% for the 
region, as a whole. In the 1970s, inflation rose more 
rapidly: two countries registered annual rates of more 
than 100%, 13 registered increases of between 10% 
and 50%, while the remaining figures are above 5%, 
yielding an annual average of 39% for all of Latin 
America. In the 1980s, inflation went out of control: 
five countries had annual rates of more than 1 000%, 
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Table 1 
RETAIL PRICES: 

































































































































































































































































Source: Intenialional Monetary Fund, Yearbook of International Financial Statistics, 1985 and ECLAC, Preliminary overview of the 
Latin American and Caribbean economy. 
year, rising constantly and rapidly for four 
consecutive years to reach an annual rate of 
400 000% towards the end of July 1989. Then, it fell 
during several months but again shot up to its current 
hyperinflationary levels (March 1990). 
The third fact to be observed from the table is 
that, in spite of a clear tendency to rise, the tempo of 
price increases fell on occasion, at times 
considerably. There are few examples of successful 
stabilization policies, but the table shows pronounced 
declines in Chile from 1974 to 1982, in Bolivia from 
1985 to 1987 and in Mexico from 1987 to 1989; and 
less spectacular declines in Argentina and Brazil from 
1985 to 1986; and in Ecuador and Nicaragua between 
1988 and 1989. In periods prior to those reported in 
the table or hidden in the 10-year averages there were 
considerable reductions in inflation in Paraguay in 
1953-1954; Bolivia 1956-1958; Argentina 1959-1960 
and 1967-1969; Chile 1960-1961; Brazil 1964-1969; 
and Uruguay 1968-1970. Reducing inflation is a very 
difficult task but it has been achieved on many 
occasions. For that reason, we should analyse how it 
was achieved in each case. We must study the 
successes of the past and learn from them. 
and three reached or, at times, surpassed monthly 
rates of 50% (13 000% annually), which Philip 
Cagan considers to be definitive of hyperinflation. 
To complete the scene, it must be noted that two of 
the five countries with annual rates higher than 
1 000% managed to lower those rates to below 20%. 
Inflation in Bolivia fell abruptly from an annual rate 
of 21 000% in August 1985 to -25% the following 
month. It fluctuated erratically until January 1986 
and, since then, has remained below 20%. Mexico, 
for its part, managed to lower inflation from an 
annual rate of 214% in January 1988 to 16% in July, a 
level it has maintained since then. In Argentina, 
inflation registered very marked fluctuations in the 
1980s: in the first half of the decade, it rose rapidly to 
an annual rate of 2 500% in July 1985 and fell to an 
average annual rate of 30% in the second half of that 
year, although it began to rise again the following 
Philip Cagan, "The monetary dynamics of hyperinflation", 
Studies in the Quantify Theory of Money, Milton Freidman (éd.), 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956 
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A further finding, as important as those cited 
above, as becomes clear in the analysis of table 2, is 
that in each of the last four decades inflation in Latin 
America has been considerably higher than that of 
other developing countries and very much higher than 
in industrial countries. Equally serious is the fact that 
this greater inflationary intensity has become 
gradually more pronounced: in the 1950s, it was a 
little more than double that of other developing 
countries and nearly four times higher than in 
industrial nations; in the 1980s it was seven times 
higher than in the Middle East, 20 times higher than 
in Asia and nearly 30 times higher than in the 
industrial countries. 
Table 2 
RETAIL PRICES IN FOUR GROUPS OF 
COUNTRIES: 1951-1989 
































Source: International Monetary Fund, Yearbook of International 
Financial Statistics. 
II 
The persistence of inflation 
1. The great enigma of contemporary economics 
In order to analyse the problem of prices in recent 
years, we first must ask why inflation has continued, 
since accelerated price hikes have occurred within a 
pre-existent process. And, more importantly, in order 
to elaborate and implement an effective anti-
inflationary policy, we must understand the 
mechanism that sustains the phenomenon. The 
persistence of inflation is the great enigma of 
contemporary economics. 
Economic theory clearly identifies the pressures 
which give rise to inflation but not the factors or 
mechanisms that maintain it. Economic literature 
contains extensive and intensive analyses of the 
origins and nature of increases in aggregate demand 
beyond available supply, of cost increases and of the 
partial supply deficiencies that disorganize the 
economy, all of which cause prices to rise; but the 
reasons for the persistence of inflation have not 
been studied in depth. Unfortunately, economists 
of industrial countries have resigned themselves to 
a constant annual inflation rate of from 3% to 4%. 
They consider it to be a consequence of the 
power of labour organizations, of imperfect 
competition in the goods and services market, and of 
expectations. 
We specialists in developing countries, especially 
Latin Americans, have accepted much higher 
inflation with the same passivity, as long as it did not 
surpass 40% or 50% annually. We considered it to be 
the nearly inevitable result of the instability of 
our foreign trade. This resignation has meant a tacit 
renunciation of in-depth investigation into the 
causes of the persistence of the phenomenon. It has 
had the severely negative effect of inducing 
industrial nations to apply very restrictive policies 
and to impede the design of effective anti-inflationary 
programmes in Latin America. Therefore, we must 
study in depth, the causes of the persistence of 
inflation both of the slow rates of inflation in 
industrial nations and of the intermediate rates of 
inflation in Latin America. 
Current imperfections in the markets for labour, 
goods and services are a necessary condition for the 
persistence of inflation because the power of labour 
organizations together with unemployment insurance 
allow workers to obtain pay hikes even in times of 
unemployment; nevertheless, these factors are not 
its cause. This lies rather in the deterioration of real 
wages arising from the use of annual or multi-year 
labour contracts, which freeze wages while general 
price levels rise. Monopolistic price-fixing among 
producers is also a necessary condition for the 
persistence of inflation because it allows companies 
to reduce production while continuing to raise prices 
when the Government applies restrictive fiscal and 
monetary policies; but this is not a cause of price 
increases either. These result from wage hikes that 
occur in the renewal of work contracts. 
118 CEPAL REVIEW No. 42 {December 1990 
Expectations tend more to intensify short-term 
price rises, than long-term increases. In the short 
term, they exacerbate inflation, encouraging 
hoarding, with the consequent drop in supply; but this 
accumulation produces a deflationary effect over 
time. As long as they last, inflationary expectations 
lead to hoarding; nevertheless, this cannot continue 
indefinitely due to limits on storage space and the 
costs involved. When the process ends, inflationary 
expectations take on a deflationary role. 
Expectations of persistent price hikes raise the 
costs of longer-term projects and affect labour and 
rent contract negotiations. Nevertheless, the main 
objective of the workers in contract renewal has more 
to do with recovering their real wage losses derived 
from past price hikes than with protecting themselves 
in advance from those they expect to occur in the 
future; and the same can be said with respect to 
landlords and the rent they charge. In practice, 
contract adjustments serve both to replace losses 
occasioned by past inflation and to cover losses 
expected from ftiture inflation; but the first objective 
is the most important, since these wage and rent hikes 
would have to take place even if there existed 
absolute security that inflation would stop. Failure to 
make these adjustments would undercut wages and 
rents in real terms. 
2. Temporary lag andperiodic over-adjustment 
of wages, rent, exchange rates and 
public service charges 
The imperfect nature of competition in the markets 
for labour, goods and services creates conditions for 
the persistence of inflation. Inflationary expectations 
help maintain it, but the fundamental cause of its 
persistence is the temporary lag and periodic 
overadjustment of those prices subject to fixed-term 
contracts, such as wages and rent or subject to official 
regulation, such as exchange rates and public service 
charges. 
Work and rent contracts are usually signed for 
periods of one year, or, at times, for two years or 
more, which means that wages and rent are kept 
stable for those periods and gradually lose value with 
respect to general price levels, which means that the 
incomes of workers and landlords lose buying power 
during that time. When it is time to renew contracts, 
workers and landlords demand increases that will 
restore their real incomes and, in the case of workers, 
take into account increased productivity arising from 
technological progress and, in the case of landlords, 
changes in the property market. These increases occur 
in stages that intercross the annual price curve 
(figure 1). The data used in the figure are 35 years old 
but they are used here because labour contract 
structures have not changed. Consequently, the search 
for recent information would have entailed 
unnecessary effort. 
Wage hikes periodically surpass price index 
increases, pushing these into new increases (figure 2). 
The increases are, therefore, overadjustments and not 
simply the re-establishment of equilibrium. This 
seems to surpass the goal of the workers to recover 
their real wages, together with the companies' policy 
of maintaining real wages, without paying very much 
greater amounts. Therefore, it is necessary to 
investigate the causes of these overadjustments in 
circumstances in which the increases could be limited 
to the amount necessary to bring wages into 
equilibrium that would not put pressure on prices. In 
order to clarify this problem, it will be convenient to 
divide the question into two: i) Why are equilibrium 
wages not re-established in the first adjustments 
that occur during the early phases of inflation? and 
ii) Once inflation is under way, why do 
overadjustments occur? 
In the first rounds of contract renewal that occur 
in the early phases of inflation, the workers demand 
and obtain increases necessary to restore their wages 
to pre-inflationary levels, probably apart from small 
additional percentages due to productivity 
increments. However, the prior real level is no longer 
a real equilibrium wage because it has been reduced 
by inflation. The recovery of the prior real level 
involves an overadjustment that puts upward pressure 
on prices. In subsequent renewals, efforts to recover 
real income prior to inflation and incorporate 
productivity increases will continue to raise wages 
above equilibrium levels. Once inflation is under 
way, the mechanism that will maintain it is installed, 
i.e., the temporal lag and periodic overadjustment of 
wages and other prices subject to fixed term contracts 
or official regulation. 
The mechanism for the transmission of 
inflationary pressures expounded here is not a theory 
accepted in academic circles but is rather an 
explanation put forward in a conference sponsored by 
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Figure 1 
CHILE: WAGES AND SALARIES IN TWO INDUSTRIES: 1955-1965 
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Source: Personal archives of author and Boletín Mensual, Central Bank of Chile. 
Symbols: x Area superviso*: Rayonhül, Industria Nacional de Rayón, S.A. 
xx Area supervisor: Fábrica Victoria, Puente Alto, S.A. 
xxx Average daily wage: Rayonhill, Industria Nacional de Rayón, S. A 
xxxx Average daily wage: Fábrica Victoria, Puente Alto, S.A 
the Central Bank of Chile in August 1965 and 
developed in a book published in Spanish in 19693 
and translated into English in 1972.4 This explanation 
was not refuted but neither was it accepted until 
Dornbusch endorsed it in 1984, in a conference of the 
Institute of International Economics, and repeating it 
subsequently in a number of papers. 
2
 Central Bank oE Chile, Boletín Mensual, No. 451, Santiago, 
Chile, September 1965. 
Centre for Latin American Monetary Studies (CEMLA), 
Medidas para detener la inflación crónica en América Latina, 
Mexico City, 1969. 
Chronic Inflation in Latin America, New York, Praeger 
Publishers, 1972. 
Institute for International Economics, Inflation and 
Indexation, Washington, D.C., 1965. 
Rudiger Dornbusch, Inflation, Exchange Rates and 
Stabilization, Essays in International Finance, No. 165, Princeton, 
N.J., 1986; Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo, Deuda 
externa e inestabilidad macroeconómica en Argentina, Buenos 
Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 1988. 
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Figure 2 
CHILE: ANNUAL SALARY ADJUSTMENTS IN ONE COMPANY a 
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3. Diversity in productivity rate increases 
Another cause of the persistence of inflation lies in 
the fact that industries that increase productivity 
more rapidly do not lower the prices they charge 
consumers but, rather, raise wages, thus establishing 
the norm for wage levels to be based on economic 
activities with lower productivity increases. In those 
areas less favoured by technological progress, the fact 
that wages rise more than productivity forces 
increases in their prices, with the consequent impact 
on the general cost of living index. In the United 
States, since the end of the Second World War, 
average merchandise prices have risen at an annual 
rate of 3.8%, while those of services have risen 
at an annual rate of 5.3%, giving an annual average 
increase of 4.4% in the general consumer price index 
(table 3). 
The persistence of inflation due to cost increases 
in activities of lower productivity accounts for only 
1% or 2% annually. This is not important in annual 
1. The causes of acceleration 
The acceleration of price increases in Latin America 
in the last two decades was caused by a number of 
factors, some general in character and others specific 
to certain countries. In the 1970s, the sharp rise in oil 
prices, the much lower, yet substantial, increases in 
the prices of other primary products, and the 
considerable rise in prices of exports from industrial 
nations accelerated inflation which, however, was 
moderate in comparison with that of the 1980s. Then, 
the surge in prices was caused mainly by: a) the 
efforts of Latin American Governments to soften the 
domestic effects of the sharp decline in the 
acquisition of foreign resources resulting from the 
debt crisis and b) the drop in primary product prices. 
To these factors, a) and b), others must be added 
which affected only certain countries; c) monetary 
expansion not geared to absorb a decrease in foreign 
resources; d) the increase in the exchange rate 
resulting from the liberalization of previous controls 
inflation rates of 30% or 40% but is significant in 
annual inflation rates of 3% or 4%, as is commonly 
the case in industrial nations. 
Table 3 
UNITED STATES: PRICE INCREASES OF 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF PRODUCTS 
(1982-1984 = 100.0) 
Annual 



































of the President, Washington, D.C., 
1939. 
or arising from expectations of international payment 
disequilibria; e) guerrilla wars; and f) the automatic 
acceleration of inflation when the process surpasses 
certain levels. 
As we will see, factor c) has been the cause of 
acceleration, at one time or another, in nearly all the 
countries of the region but especially in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay; 
factor d) has accelerated inflation in Chile, Mexico 
and Venezuela; factor e) in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua; and factor f) in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Nicaragua and Peru. 
Two of the six factors mentioned, a) and b), are 
of foreign origin and are not, therefore, attributable to 
domestic policies, although these could have been 
more effective. For their part, guerrilla wars 
constitute a serious non-economic national problem. 
The other three factors are directly and immediately 
related to econom ic and financial policy and, 
therefore, must be studied with care in order to avoid 
them in the future. 
Ill 
Inflationary acceleration in the last two decades 
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2. Increases in the prices of oil, other primary 
products and imported manufactured goods 
Oil prices rose sharply in 1973-1974 and again in 
1979 and 1980, with the result that average fuel prices 
in the 1970s were eight times higher than in the 1960s 
(table 4). Also in 1973-1974, the prices of other 
primary products began a trend of increases that 
continued until 1980, raising their average value to 
double that of the 1960s; a similar trend occurred in 
the prices of exports from industrialized nations or in 
the prices of imported manufactured goods, which is 
the same thing. Given this increase in oil and other 
primary product prices, which led to considerable 
income and cost increases in producer countries, 
raising prices from the demand side and pushing them 
up from the cost side; and, given, moreover, the 
higher value of imported manufactured goods, it is no 
wonder that Latin American inflation rose from an 
average annual rate of 21% in the 1960s to 39% in the 
1970s and to around 50% by the end of that decade. 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: IN BASIC PRODUCT PRICES 
AND RATES OF INFLATION: 1961-1980 
(1961-1970=100) 
Price of oil 
Price of basic products 
Price of industrial country 
exports 
Average industrial country 
rate of inflation3 














Source: International Monetary Fund, Yearbooks of International 
Financial Statistics. 
* 3.3% in the period 1961-1970 and 8.7% in 1971-1980. 
b21.2% in the period 1961-1970 and 39.1% in 1971-1980. 
3. Policy to offset the decline in assets 
and foreign loans 
As can be seen in table 5, during the 1960s, net 
financial transfers (new loans and direct investment 
less amortization, dividend and interest payments) left 
a negative average annual balance of US$700 million. 
Positive annual averages of US$12.6 billion were 
achieved in 1971-1975 and US$23.4 billion in 
1976-Î981 in the following six years, 1982-1987, 
they became negative again, with an average annual 
loss of US$22 billion, i.e., a decline of US$45.4 
billion in the annual average of net financial transfers 
between one period and another (computed, as all the 
other figures in constant 1986 buying-power dollars). 
Table 5 
NET FINANCIAL TRANSFERS: 1961-1987 




































Source: International Monetary Fund, Internationa! Financial 
Statistics; International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, World Debt Tables; and Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Preliminary overview of ¡he economy of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
Latin American exports attained their maximum 
value of US$108.2 billion in 1981, fluctuating below 
that amount during the following years and averaging 
US$94.8 billion during the 1982-1987 period. That 
average was higher than that of the preceding five 
years, even if computed in terms of 1986 prices; 
however, as table 6 shows, total acquisition of foreign 
resources (exports plus net financial transfers) fell 
from an annual average of US$103.2 billion in 
1976-1981 to US$72.8. billion in 1982-1987, i.e., a 
decline of US$30.4 billion. This figure is equivalent 
to 3.6% of regional GDP, 22.7% of exports and 
17.3% of fiscal income. 
' Table 6 
NET FOREIGN RESOURCE ACQUISITION: 
1961-1987 


























Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics and table 3. 
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The drastic decline in foreign income presented 
governments with the dilemma either of allowing this 
phenomenon to provoke a violent contraction of 
economic activity and employment or of applying 
compensatory policies which would inevitably 
accelerate inflation. Governments chose the second 
alternative but, even so, could not avoid GDP 
contractions of 1.4% in 1982 and 2.9% in 1983, with 
a very slow rate of growth in the following years, 
which was less than population growth. For its part, 
the average Latin American inflation rate rose from 
57% in 1981 to 85%, 130%, 185% and 274% in 
the following years (table 1). 
In the process described, inflationary acceleration 
was caused by economic policy aimed at absorbing a 
sharp drop in the acquisition of foreign resources. 
This outlines the situation which gave rise to the 
structuralist theory of inflation, first articulated by 
Juan F, Noyola and later reformulated in more 
systematic form by Osvaldo Sunkei, Aníbal Pinto and 
Raúl Prebisch. This theory argued that Latin 
American inflation was not due to lack of foresight or 
extravagance but to imperfections in the productive 
apparatus and instability in foreign trade. These 
factors forced governments to implement com-
pensatory policies which generated inflationary 
trends. 
Juan F. Noyola Vázquez, "El desarrollo económico y la 
inflación en México y otros países latinoamericanos", Investigación 
económica, vol. 16, No. 4, Mexico City, National School of 
Economy, 1956; Osvaldo Sunkei, "La inflación chilena: un enfoque 
heterodoxo", El trimestre económico, vol. 25, No. 4, Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, October-December, 1958; Aníbal Pinto, Ni 
estabilidad ni desarrollo: ¡a política del Fondo Monetario, 
Santiago, Chile, Centre for Research and Social Action, 1960; Raúl 
Prebisch, "Economic development or monetary stability: The false 
dilemma", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. 6, No. 1, 
Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), March 1961, Dudley Seers, "A theory of 
inflation and growth in underdeveloped countries", Oxford 
Economic Papers, vol. 14, London, Oxford University Press, 1962; 
Aldo Ferrer, "Reflexiones acerca de la política de estabilización en 
la Argentina", El trimestre económico, vol. 30, No. 4, Mexico City, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, October-December, 1963; Eduardo 
García, "Inflation in Chile, a quantitative analysis", 1964, mimeo; 
Héctor Maíavé Mata, "Metodologia del análisis estructural de ¡a 
inflación", El trimestre económico, vol. 35, No. 3, Mexico City, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, July-September 1968; and Camilo 
Dagum, "Un modelo econométrico sobre la inflación estructural", 
El trimestre económico, vol. 37, No. 1, Mexico City, Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, January-March 1970. 
4. Monetary expansion not aimed at absorbing the 
drop in foreign assets 
The direct and immediate cause of inflation is 
obviously monetary expansion. As explained above, 
such expansion can be used to finance compensatory 
policies, or can originate from the idea that monetary 
expansion does not raise prices in situations of 
unemployment and unused productive capacity, or 
can result from irresponsible financial policies. The 
first cause has been analysed in the previous section 
and the third cannot be justified, but the second is 
little understood and, therefore, merits explanation. 
The belief that, in situations of unemployment 
and unused productive capacity, monetary expansion 
does not generate inflation is based on an erroneous 
application of Keynesian theory which forgets that 
this will be true in closed but not in open economies 
and in countries with low gold reserves and affected 
by a lack of funds. When a country with an open 
economy and unused productive capacity possesses 
international reserves, the expansion of demand can, 
for a time, increase production without provoking 
inflation, because accumulated funds will finance the 
increased imports resulting from greater domestic 
activity. However, when the reserves are spent, 
inflation takes off, the economy becomes 
disorganized, production contracts and unem-
ployment increases. 
Expansion of demand as an instrument of 
development policy has been applied, at one time or 
another, in many of our countries. To illustrate its 
effects, it is sufficient to study the figures (table 7) for 
the main macroeconomic variables of Chile in 
1970-1973 and Peru in 1985-1988, when this policy 
was applied. In Chile, the deliberate expansion of 
demand was successful during the first two years, 
when the real product rose and the inflation rate was 
stable, but it began to have negative effects during the 
third year and became critical during the fourth year, 
in which inflation took off, economic activity 
contracted sharply and real salaries plummeted. In 
Peru, the favourable effects lasted three years but the 
crisis that began in the fourth year was even more 
serious than that suffered by Chile. 
In spite of these arguments and the facts 
themselves, we economists have frequently 
maintained the illusion that, when labour and 
infrastructure are available, monetary expansion will 
increase production and not prices. On the basis of 
this illusion, we have had recourse to monetary 
expansion, although it is difficult to discern when 
this has been motivated by the hope of increasing 
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Table 7 
CHILE AND PERU: EFFECTS OF DELIBERATE EXPANSION OF DEMAND AS DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Rate of increase in 
public spending (%) 
Inflation rate (%) 
Rate of real growth (%) 
Commercial balance (millions of 
dollars) 
International reserves (millions 
of dollars) 



























































Source: Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, "Economic crises and the macroeconomics of populism in Latin America: lesson from 
Chile and Peru", m'imeo, March 1989. 
production or when it was merely irresponsibility. Be 
that as it may, inflationary acceleration, in many 
cases, has been the consequence of monetary 
expansion that should not have occurred. 
5. Increases in exchange rates due to liberalization 
of controls or unfavourable expectations 
During 1971-1973, while a policy involving the 
deliberate expansion of demand was being applied in 
Chile, inflation was partially contained through the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate. Table 8 shows 
that, between 1969 and the third trimester of 1973, 
the exchange rate rose nearly 250%, more than three 
times retail prices (860%). The liberalization of the 
exchange rate decreed by the new authorities caused 
it to rise more than 2 300% in the following 
15 months, a period in which retail prices rose little 
more than 1 000%. In 1975, the exchange rate rose 
490% and prices 375%. This inflationary acceleration 
was basically a consequence of the liberation of 
pressures restrained by the overvalued exchange rate 
of the previous three years but it also had its own 
momentum. In fact, a devaluation to equilibrium 
would have meant an increase of from 25 to 90 pesos 
per dollar in December 1973, and not to 360 pesos 
per dollar, which is what happened in the free market. 
Such a devaluation would perhaps have been able to 
contain the increase of the dollar from 90 to only 200 
pesos, or less, in the following 12 months, in contrast 
to the 1 870 pesos of December 1974.8 The extremely 
8
 This figures does not coincide with that of table 8 because 
the latter reports annual averages and not end-of-year values. 
high rate of inflation in Chile in 1974,1975 and 1976 
was a consequence not only of the liberation of pre-
viously contained pressures but of the multiplication 
of these pressures in the exchange rate-prices-wages 
spiral. 
Table 8 
CHILE: EXCHANGE RATE AND RETAIL PRICE 
INCREASES: 1970-1976 
(Percentages) 
























Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics. 
"First three quarters. 
b
 Last quarter oí 1973 and all of 1974. 
Inflationary acceleration stimulated by auto-
nomous rises of the exchange rate took place in 
Mexico in 1982-1988 and in Venezuela in 1989. The 
strong increase in the rate of inflation in Mexico, 
from 28% in 1981 to 59% in 1982 and to figures that 
fluctuated around 100% for six years, was basically, 
though not exclusively, due to capital flight provoked 
by the debt crisis. The effects of inflation themselves 
caused the exchange rate to rise rapidly, which, in 
turn, accelerated price hikes. In Venezuela, inflation 
increases, from an average rate of 35% in 1988 to 
90% the following year, were due to the exchange 
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unification decreed in February 1989, which caused 
the average import exchange rate to rise from 18.1 
bolivars per dollar that month to a free and unified 
rate which fluctuated between 36.9 and 34.7 bohvars 
between March and December, a 120% real exchange 
rate increase. Table 10 presents variations in the real 
exchange rate and the monthly and annual inflation 
rates for 1989 and the first three months of 1990. 
Table 9 































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics. 
Table 10 
VENEZUELA: EXCHANGE RATE AND RETAIL 
















































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics. 
6. Guerrilla movements 
In Latin America, guerrilla movements have become 
strong enough to increase inflation in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua. El Salvador went from an average rate of 
1% in the 1960s to 11% in the 1970s and to rates 
slightly higher than 20% in 1985, 1986 and 1989. In 
Nicaragua, the tempo of price hikes rose from 1% in 
the 1960s to 18% in the 1970s and to rapidly rising 
annual rates in the 1980s, reaching levels of 
hyperinflation. Probably in Peru, the guerrilla 
movement has contributed to inflation, although the 
determinant factor clearly was the policy of deliberate 
expansion of demand. 
Given the great difference between the intensity 
of inflation in El Salvador and Nicaragua, it would be 
worth while to investigate the cause. This would 
require obtaining information on the damage caused 
by the guerrilla movement in each country. Without 
such information, it can be assumed that the lower 
inflation observed in El Salvador was due to the much 
greater foreign aid received by that country, which 
allowed it to maintain a much more stable exchange 
rate and to apply more conservative fiscal and 
monetary policies. 
7. Automatic acceleration of inflation when certain 
levels are surpassed 
When the rate of inflation rises above tolerance 
levels, more and more worker organizations demand 
and obtain wage increases before their contracts 
expire. These increases further stimulate inflation and 
provoke a further reduction of the adjustment interval, 
which is initially cut to six months and, then, to three 
months, one month, one week, one day. At first, the 
adjustment is based on the cost of living index but, 
since today it is published after one or two months 
have passed, it is replaced by another price hike 
indicator: the best known and most up-to-date is the 
current price of some foreign currency, generally the 
dollar. As adjustment periods become shorter, the 
persistence mechanism grows progressively weaker, 
until it disappears completely. This is why there 
comes a time when hyperinflation loses its 
momentum and suddenly stops, with the cessation of 
exogenous pressures of demand and costs, or of the 
partial deficiency of supply which affected the 
economy. 
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This mechanism has been the cause of the 
acceleration of price hikes to hyperinflationary levels 
in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru and 
I. Successful policies in the past 
The information in table 12 demonstrates that, in the 
last decades, some Latin American countries have 
managed to reduce their inflation rates substantially, 
for shorter or longer periods of time. Since the author 
of this article is not fully familiar with the policies 
applied in Paraguay in 1953-1954 and in Bolivia in 
1956-1958, they will not be considered in the 
following analysis. In the other cases, eight countries 
took measures especially designed to disconnect the 
mechanism of overadjustment; two began a drastic 
deceleration of the depreciation of the exchange rate; 
and the last country adopted an orthodox programme 
which brought about a sharp drop in its 
hyperinflation, in a way similar to that which ended 
hyperinflation in Central Europe after the World 
Wars. 
Policies for ending the overadjustment process 
have assumed three different modalities over the 
years. In the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, the 
procedure consisted in limiting the wage hikes 
has conferred specific characteristics on the processes 
of those countries, which must be taken into account 
in the design of policies designed to stop them. 
established in contract renewals to the equivalent of 
half the inflation rate of the adjustment period, plus a 
small percentage for increased productivity. Towards 
the end of the 1960s, a formula of scaled wage 
increases tended to prevail, by virtue of which greater 
increases benefited those workers who had gone 
longer without an adjustment. Finally, in the 1980s, 
the choice was made to create a new monetary unit 
and to regulate the conversion of work contracts 
signed in terms of the previous monetary unit into 
contracts using the new money. 
The first procedure allowed for the reduction of 
inflation in Chile, from 76% in 1955 to 29% in 1958 
and from 39% in 1959 to 8% in 1961; in Argentina, 
from 114% in 1959 to 27% in 1960; and in Brazil, 
form 91% in 1964 to 22% in 1968, making an 
average growth rate of 9.4% possible for the 
following eight years. 
The second method was applied in Argentina 
during the 1967-1969 period and brought about a 
decrease in inflation from 29% to 8%; and in 
Uruguay from 125% to 17% in 1968-1970. Finally, 
Table 11 
HYPERINFLATION 



































































Source: Felipe Pazos, Chronic inflation in Latin America, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1972. 
a
 July 1923-April 1924. 
b
 May 1923-February 1924. 
c
 October 1923 July 1924. 
d
 September 1923-June 1924. 
'July 1944-April 1945. 
IV 
Measures for stopping inflation 
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the third formula was used in the Austral and Cruzado 
Plans implemented by the Governments of Argentina 
and Brazil respectively, both in 1985-1986. The 
Austral Plan lowered inflation from an annual rate of 
2 554% in July 1985, to an average annual rate of 
33% in the following seven months, although prices 
were soon to rise sharply again. In Brazil, the 
Cruzado Plan caused inflation to fall from an annual 
rate of 535% in February, 1986 to an average rate of 
14.6% in the following seven months, a period at the 
end of which, however, prices rose again 
exponentially. 
We will now deal with programmes designed not 
to disconnect the overadjustment mechanism but to 
decelerate the exchange rate depreciation. For 
example, Chile reduced inflation from slightly more 
than 1000% in 1974 to 20% in 1981 through a 
stabilization plan whose essential element was the 
deceleration of the rise in the dollar exchange rate 
from 2 328% in 1974 to zero in 1981, followed by 
low incremental increases in the following years. 
Mexico reduced inflation from an annual rate of 
214% in January 1988 to 18% in the following 
September, by applying a policy designed mainly to 
freeze the exchange rate for that year, limiting 
depreciation to 1.3% monthly (16.8% annually) 
beginning in January 1989. 
The halt in exchange rate depreciation is an 
effective anti-inflationary policy because it slows 
price increases for internationally tradeable goods, 
whose weight in the cost of living index is less than 
30%. By containing increases in that area, this policy 
leads to moderation in wage hikes, as the annual 
contracts of different worker groups come up for 
renewal. In the absence of other inflationary 
pressures, the deceleration of exchange rate deprecia-
tion can halt the inflation process in one or two years 
and in even briefer periods, if the interval between 
wage adjustments has been shortened due to the 
intensity of price hikes. However, this method 
achieves its objective at the cost of overvaluing the 
currency and discouraging exports which, after a 
short time, provokes an exchange crisis that sparks 
inflation once again. 
Both in Chile and Mexico, policies of exchange 
overvaluation were implemented after a period of 
rapid depreciation, which stimulated inflation but 
which was, in fact, more rapid (tables 8 and 9). The 
exchange rate was obviously undervalued, which 
gave room for revaluating it without letting it go too 
high. However, those were exceptional circum-
stances, since exchange revaluation is a highly risky 
policy, by no means advisable as a means of detaining 
inflation. 
Table 12 











































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
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The third effective anti-inflationary plan was that 
of Bolivia, the first Latin American country to which 
levels defined by Cagan as hyperinflation and, until 
the recent price explosions in Argentina, Brazil and 
Peru, the only country in the world in which this 
process had not been caused by war or revolution. 
Hyperinflation in Bolivia was the result of systematic 
fiscal disequilibria, freely financed by foreign banks 
between 1975 and 1980 and by the Central Bank 
during the first half of the 1980s. Prices rose from an 
annual average rate of 20% in the 1970s to 32% in 
1981 and accelerated in the following years, to 127% 
in 1982, 276% in 1983 and 1 281% in 1984, reaching 
11 743% in 1985. This last figure is the equivalent of 
a monthly average of 49%, which rose to 56% in the 
last week of August, before falling sharply to a 
negative rate of 2.9% in the first week of September. 
Hyperinflation ended in the same sudden fashion in 
Central Europe at the end of the World Wars and, as 
in those cases, its end can be attributed to the loss of 
inertial persistence, more than to the measures taken 
to stop it, which had been implemented only days 
before. 
The stabilization plan of Bolivia consisted in an 
orthodox programme of public expense reductions, 
tax and public service tariff hikes, privatization of 
State companies and general economic liberalization. 
Credit cannot be given to the programme for the end 
of hyperinflation, since it did not have time to achieve 
that goal, although it did halt pressures in the 
following months and maintained inflation below an 
annual rate of 20% in subsequent years. 
2. Characteristics and lessons of successful plans 
The study of Latin American plans which have been 
successful in substantially reducing inflation reveals 
that all of them ended the process of overadjustment, 
applying wage and price controls, or decelerated the 
process, slowing exchange rate depreciation. 
It is also clear that none of the plans was based 
exclusively or mainly on restriction of aggregate 
demand. 
Controls applied to end the process of 
overadjustment have been transitory and have not 
affected market operations nor have they distorted the 
structure of relative prices. Neither has deceleration 
of the exchange rate brought about negative effects, 
due to the special circumstances in the countries 
which had recourse to that policy. 
It is also clear that plans which have not 
implemented adequate measures for the restoration of 
financial equilibrium have been effective for only 
brief periods, after which inflation reappeared with 
great force; on the other hand, countries which took 
such measures have maintained relative stability for 
longer periods. 
The substantial reduction in price increases 
achieved by these plans shows that inflation is 
controllable. This is a very important conclusion 
because one of the obstacles which the struggle 
against inflation in Latin America faces is the belief 
that it is an unavoidable evil, due to the instability of 
foreign trade and imperfections in the economic 
structures of our countries, according to some, or to 
deficient government administration, according to 
others. 
3. The need to end the process of 
overadjustment and re-establish 
basic economic equilibria 
Analysis of the causes of inflation and of the plans 
which have managed to contain it shows that it is 
necessary to end the process of overadjustment. It 
also demonstrates that the more advisable of the two 
formulae available for this purpose consists in 
establishing transitory wage and price controls 
because the deceleration of the process through 
gradual revaluation of the exchange rate implies the 
risk of overvaluation and, therefore, of discouraging 
growth of exports. 
In their book on Argentina,9 Dombusch and 
De Pablo clearly and convincingly explain that 
temporary wage and price controls do not seek to 
replace the mechanism of the market and consumer 
freedom but seek rather to re-establish the normal 
functioning of that mechanism and allow economic 
agents to obtain undistorted information for their 
decisions. Temporary control can be effective when 
it is not prolonged beyond a couple of months 
because, in that short time, the structure of 
relative prices is not distorted by that control. 
Radlger Dombusch and J.C. De Pablo, op. cit. 
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It is necessary to understand clearly how and 
why temporary controls designed to break 
inflationary inertia do not replace the mechanism of 
the market but rather perfect it. Failure to understand 
this phenomenon prejudices many economists against 
an indispensable policy for halting inflation or for 
reducing its intensity to bearable rates. 
The temporary wage and price controls necessary 
to break inflationary inertia are not an alternative to 
the adoption of financial policy that would balance 
aggregate demand and total supply. Measures to 
rationalize the budget and halt monetary expansion 
must be taken simultaneously. If financial equilibrium 
is not restored, excessive demand will make prices 
rise and reactivate inflation. 
When formulating policies for fiscal correction, 
financial authorities must be aware that, measured in 
real terms, government assets fall when inflation 
accelerates and rise again when inflation falls. This 
can be attributed to the Oliveira-Tanzi effect, i.e., to 
the fact that government assets lose real value 
between the date when taxes are computed and that 
on which they are collected, losses being greater in 
conditions of higher inflation. It is foreseeable, then, 
that income will increase in real terms when inflation 
decreases, although not to the extent necessary to 
balance the budget. Consequently, it is necessary to 
raise taxes and public service charges or reduce 
expenses to cover the budget deficit which will 
probably remain, in spite of increased real income 
due to decelerated inflation. 
Financial authorities must also be aware that 
economic agents reduce their monetary balances to 
painfully low levels during periods of rapid inflation 
and restore them to normal levels when inflation 
slackens. For this reason, it is possible to expand 
monetary supply in this phase, without provoking 
inflationary effects, up to the amount required to 
restore normal liquid balances. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that stabilization can be achieved with 
a lax monetary policy: for the positive effects of 
breaking inflationary inertia to become firmly 
established, fiscal policy and monetary policy must 
achieve and maintain strict macroeconomic 
equilibrium. 
4. Equilibrium in international payments 
The fiscal and monetary policies designed to balance 
domestic accounts, also balance international 
payments on regular accounts, although it does so at 
a low level of economic activity. Therefore, strategy 
for stabilization must be accompanied by policies 
designed to promote a high level of exports, 
taking into account the possibility that this high 
level of activity may lead to foreign deficits, which 
would require financing with international reserves 
or by postponing foreign debt service. Consequently, 
maintaining foreign equilibrium and high produc-
tion and employment levels simultaneously requires: 
i) application of conservative financial policy; 
ii) establishment of an exchange rate that stimulates 
exports; iii) implementation of an anticyclic policy 
with respect to international reserves and foreign debt 
service. 
These are the three classic prescriptions in this 
matter, except the third recommends anticyclic 
policies, not with respect to acquiring new foreign 
loans, but to interest and amortization payments on 
previously contracted loans. In the circumstances in 
which Latin American countries currently operate, 
with a debt many times greater than their capacity to 
pay, an increase of that debt cannot be recommended. 
Rather, they must try to lower the rate of growth of 
that debt as much as possible. 
5. The special case of hyperinflation 
When price hikes have reached hyperinflationary 
levels, it is no longer necessary to install temporary 
controls to end the process of lags and 
overadjustments, since the shortening of intervals 
between increases has already performed that task. 
This explains why hyperinflation ended from one 
month to the next in Germany, Austria, Hungary and 
Poland after the First World War; and in Greece, after 
the Second. And it explains the abrupt end of the 
recent hyperinflation in Bolivia. 
Given the rapid disappearance of the 
phenomenon in the countries of Central Europe after 
the World Wars and the more recent experience of 
Bolivia, it was reasonable to expect that the same 
process would occur in Argentina and Brazil, 
overwhelmed by explosive inflation. But this has not 
happened. More than half a year after the 
implementation of rigorous stabilization programmes 
in these two countries, in July 1990, retail prices were 
rising at an annual rate of more than 340% in 
Argentina and around 430% in Brazil. Why has the 
hyperinflation of these two countries not behaved in 
ways similar to those observed in other countries in 
the past? This is a question to which we must dedicate 
our best efforts. 
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VI 
Conclusions 
In Latin America, as in the rest of the world, inflation 
is maintained by lags and subsequent overadjustments 
of prices subject to contract or official regulation and 
is accelerated or decelerated by deficits or positive 
balances in the country's foreign or domestic 
accounts. Consequently, anti-inflationary program-
mes must attack both factors, with measures to reduce 
overadjustments to normal levels and policies that 
will balance domestic assets and debits and 
international payments. The reduction of over-
adjustments to normal levels requires the application 
of simple controls for brief periods, which need not 
distort the structure of relative prices nor affect the 
efficient allocation of resources which will continue 
to occur through the mechanism of the market. 
Domestic financial balance must be re-established 
through higher taxes and public service charges or 
reduced public expenses, or through a combination of 
both measures; and foreign equilibrium must be 
achieved and maintained through the application of 
i) a policy of domestic financial balance; Ü) an 
exchange rate that stimulates exports; iii) an 
anticyclic foreign debt service plan which will lower 
payments when the country's export income falls and 
raise them when exports rise. 
In situations of hyperinflation, wage and price 
controls are not necessary to put an end to the process 
of lag and overadjustment. With daily adjustments, 
wages no longer lose ground with respect to average 
prices. However, it is still absolutely necessary to 
re-establish domestic and foreign financial 
equilibrium and create confidence that it will be 
maintained. 
The spectacular worsening of inflation in Latin 
America in recent years could facilitate the struggle 
against this social and economic scourge and reduce 
its intensity to the levels found in industrial countries, 
because it has obliged us to scrutinize the measures 
necessary to achieve this goal and because it ought to 
give us the resolve to apply these measures. 
It is perhaps justified, then, to repeat that control 
of inflation constitutes the most urgent task for 
economic science and the central problem that we 
Latin American economists must solve in order to 
alleviate the suffering of millions of persons, renew 
the development of our countries and rescue the 
prestige of our profession. 
